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Abstract
China’s deepening engagement in the global trading system and the threat of its export
capacity have aﬀected the negotiation, formation, and rules of international trade agreements.
Among other changes, China’s 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) intro-
duced new allowances for existing members to deviate from core WTO principles of reciprocity
and most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment by giving existing members access to a discriminatory,
import-restricting China safeguard based on the threat of “trade deﬂection.” This paper asks
whether there is historical evidence that imposing discriminatory trade restrictions against China
during its pre-accession period led to Chinese exports surging to alternative markets. To examine
this question, we use a newly constructed data set of product-level, discriminatory trade policy
actions imposed on Chinese exports to two of its largest destination markets over the 1992-2001
period. Perhaps surprisingly, we ﬁnd no systematic evidence that either U.S. or EU imposition
of such import restrictions during this period deﬂected Chinese exports to alternative destina-
tions. To the contrary, we provide evidence that such import restrictions may have a chilling
eﬀect on China’s exports of these products to secondary markets - i.e., the conditional mean U.S.
antidumping duty on China is associated with a 20 percentage point reduction in the relative
growth rate of China’s targeted exports. We explore explanations for these puzzling results as
well as potential implications for the sustainability of the rules of the world trading system.
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are our own.1 Introduction
China’s entry into global markets has had an important eﬀect on the rules of the world trading system.
After close to ﬁfteen years of negotiations that began under the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and
Trade (GATT), China was ﬁnally granted membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
2001. While China’s accession to the organization was heralded as a signiﬁcant achievement for trade
policy negotiators, its terms of accession introduced new allowances for existing members to deviate
from historic and core GATT/WTO principles. In particular, the commitment that members adhere
to the fundamental rules of reciprocity and most-favored nation (MFN) treatment, the second of which
is also referred to as nondiscriminatory treatment across trading partners, was substantially weakened
through the introduction of a newly available “China safeguard” import-restricting policy instrument.
A political justiﬁcation for the new safeguard was that China’s export capacity threatened to disrupt
established trade patterns. Furthermore, an unprecedented statutory trigger for use of the import
restriction is the phenomenon of “trade deﬂection,” i.e., where a second country’s imports from China
surge because of a ﬁrst country imposing its own trade restriction that shut Chinese exports out of
its market.
This paper empirically investigates whether there is historical evidence that the imposition of
discriminatory import restrictions on Chinese trade deﬂected Chinese exports to secondary markets
during its pre-accession period. Since the discriminatory China safeguard was not in use during this
period, we address the question by matching data on Chinese exports to roughly forty destination
markets to a new dataset of discriminatory antidumping measures imposed on China by two of its
most important trading partners. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to investigate
whether Chinese exports have been deﬂected to alternative markets when hit with discriminatory
trade restrictions. Prior research investigating related questions has found evidence of such trade
deﬂection; nevertheless, the prior evidence has not investigated Chinese exports, as it has been limited
to the examination of exports from other countries and/or is focused on speciﬁc industries.1
WTO members created a “Transitional Product-Speciﬁc Safeguard Mechanism” that can be used
against imports from China until 2014 under Section 16 of China’s terms of accession (WTO, 2001).
Many characteristics of the new China safeguard are at odds with core WTO principles and estab-
1In work motivated by the EU’s 2002 global safeguard policy on steel which invoked a similar concern over trade
deﬂection emanating from the U.S. steel safeguard (EU, 2002), Bown and Crowley (2007) ﬁnd substantial evidence
that the imposition of administered import-restricting trade policies against Japanese exports led to export surges
to alternative markets. Durling and Prusa’s (2006) investigation of global exports from the hot rolled steel market
provides some evidence for trade deﬂection, as does Debaere’s (2005) investigation of the shrimp market in response to
the EU’s discriminatory revocation of GSP status for Thai exporters.
1lished instruments of administered import protection traditionally available to its Members.2 First,
unlike any other import-restricting policy instrument legally available to the WTO membership, the
allowance of a China-speciﬁc trade restriction on imports of fairly traded goods is otherwise incon-
sistent with MFN treatment.3 Second, the use of the new China safeguard also does not require the
policy-imposing country to immediately compensate China for withdrawing trade concessions. This,
in eﬀect, weakens the commitment to the WTO’s reciprocity principle as well.4
The most radical change introduced by the new China safeguard is the weakened evidentiary
criterion that WTO members must satisfy in order to legally impose a new barrier to Chinese trade.
Speciﬁcally, section 16.8 of China’s accession introduced the following,
“If a WTO Member considers that an action [i.e., a China safeguard imposed by another
Member]... causes or threatens to cause signiﬁcant diversions of trade into its market [i.e.,
‘trade deﬂection’], it may request consultations with China and/or the WTO Member
concerned... If such consultations fail to lead to an agreement... the requesting WTO
Member shall be free, in respect of such product, to withdraw concessions accorded to or
otherwise limit imports from China...” (WTO, 2001, p. 10).
The implication of section 16.8 is that, if one WTO member imposes a China safeguard, a second
WTO member can automatically impose a China safeguard on the same product without having to
undertake its own injury investigation. Thus the second country can impose a China safeguard on the
same product without having to demonstrate actual evidence of a threat of deﬂected imports from
China, evidence of an actual increase in imports from China, or even evidence of injury (or a threat of
2Some of the discriminatory elements of the China safeguard are reminiscent Japan’s 1955 entry into the GATT.
In particular, a 1987 GATT working party pointed out that, despite the desire at the time for some existing members
to introduce a new Japan-speciﬁc safeguard, “Japan became a contracting party in September 1955 without any new
general safeguard clause being added to the General Agreement. Some [13 out of 34] contracting parties invoked
Article XXXV [“Non-Application of the Agreement between Speciﬁc Contracting Parties”] on Japan’s accession. In a
number of cases, Japan negotiated bilateral trade agreements containing special safeguard clauses which were followed
by the countries concerned disinvoking Article XXXV.” (GATT 1987, p. 2) For an additional discussion of the China
safeguard, see Messerlin (2004).
3There are three other primary areas under the WTO in which exceptions to MFN-treatment for import restrictions
are broadly permissible: 1) raising discriminatory trade barriers against unfairly traded goods under antidumping or
countervailing duty laws; 2) lowering trade barriers in a discriminatory manner under a reciprocal preferential trade
agreement; and 3) lowering trade barriers in a discriminatory manner to developing countries unilaterally, such as under
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).
4Bagwell and Staiger (1999) provide an economic interpretation of reciprocity under the GATT/WTO, noting that
it is primarily a rule for renegotiations that limits a WTO trading partner’s permissible compensatory retaliation when
a ﬁrst country seeks to raise its tariﬀ above a previously agreed-upon level, as would be the case here.
2injury) to its own domestic industry. This is a substantial diﬀerence from all other WTO-authorized
import restrictions, which require some evidence and impose a nontrivial resource and political cost
on a country seeking to limit the market access previously granted to another WTO member.5 This
policy is based on the now codiﬁed provision that there exists a substantial threat that one country’s
China safeguard will deﬂect Chinese exports to a secondary market.
Thus far, the most public battles over use of the new China safeguard focused on the U.S. and
EU imposing import restrictions on fair trade from China in the textile and clothing sectors in 2005.6
Nevertheless, any WTO member can impose a China safeguard on any of China’s exported products,
an increasing share of which are outside of the textiles and apparel sectors. Data collected from
the WTO and reported in Bown (2007) indicates that at least 10 diﬀerent WTO members initiated
investigations under the new China-safeguard policy between 2002 and 2006, with at least ﬁve of
those countries imposing trade-restricting measures on products as varied as ﬂoat glass, polyvinyl
chloride and porcelain tiles (Turkey), in addition to textiles and clothing products (U.S., EU, Peru
and Colombia). An examination of countries with relatively transparent import policy governance
such as Canada (CITT, 2007) and the U.S. (ITC, 2007) indicates that WTO members were quick to
include the “trade deﬂection” provision into their domestic implementing legislation thus making it
readily accessible for competing industries and policymakers seeking a new trigger to limit Chinese
exports.7
Is there historical evidence that discriminatory trade restrictions imposed on China have disrupted
trade ﬂows via trade deﬂection? To investigate this question we examine the impact of discriminatory
trade policies on Chinese product-level exports over its pre-accession 1992-2001 period. We focus on
U.S. and EU imposition of product-speciﬁc, discriminatory import restrictions.8 As table 1 indicates,
one motivation for focusing on the U.S. and EU is that they are two of China’s four largest destination
markets for its exports. If China’s exporters are able to deﬂect trade, these are two of the markets
from which we expect trade deﬂection to derive.9 Moreover, our focus on the eﬀect of U.S. and
5The standard safeguard investigation requires evidence of injury (or threat thereof) caused by increased imports.
Antidumping (countervailing duty) investigations also require evidence of less than fair value pricing (illegal export
subsidies) in addition to the evidence of injury caused by imports. For a discussion of the general role of safeguards in
the WTO, see Hoekman and Kostecki (2001).
6See, for example, “Made in Washington: How the Textile Industry Alone Won Quotas on Chinese Imports,” Wall
Street Journal, 10 November 2005, p. A1.
7For the U.S., see ‘Section 422: China Trade Diversion Investigations’ of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, and for Canada,
see ‘Safeguard Inquiry: Trade Diversion Imports from China’ of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act.
8In what follows below, for convenience we may refer to the EU as a “country” since it invokes a singular trade
policy stance toward Union non-members such as China.
9Furthermore, we believe there are good reasons to be less interested in focusing on two other primary export
markets for China - Hong Kong and Japan - as the “triggers” for the trade deﬂection. While Hong Kong was technically
3EU discriminatory trade policies is motivated by data requirements. Both the U.S. and EU utilize
discriminatory, antidumping import restrictions and publish very detailed, product-level information
on these policies. Using newly collected data on policy impositions at the product level (Bown, 2005)
allows us to directly identify evidence of trade deﬂection associated with such measures.10
Furthermore, as table 2 indicates, the U.S. and EU are useful countries on which to focus because
their antidumping authorities frequently targeted Chinese exports with new, discriminatory import
restrictions. Indeed, China faced the most antidumping investigations and the most imposed mea-
sures over the 1992-2001 period, nearly twice as many as the next most-targeted exporter. And as
the middle columns indicate, under both the U.S. and EU antidumping regimes, China was also a
frequent single target of investigation, implying that it often faced the imposition of discriminatory
antidumping measures that will be most similar to the WTO’s new China safeguard.11 Moreover,
even in investigations that target multiple foreign countries exporting the same product, an importer
can discriminate against China by imposing higher antidumping duties or more stringent price under-
taking requirements than those that are imposed on non-Chinese exporters of the same product. The
second-to-last column provides evidence that China faces higher-than-average antidumping measures
as well.
Nevertheless, despite China being a frequent target of both countries, as table 3 indicates, there is
surprisingly little overlap to the Chinese products that are targeted by both the U.S. and EU regimes.
For example, of the 123 unique 6-digit Harmonized System (HS) products exported from China that
faced antidumping measures in the U.S. and the EU during the 1990-2001 period, only fourteen of
those products were targeted by both countries over that twelve year period. As table 4 indicates,
most of these products are in the steel (metals) and chemicals industries, and it is even more rare
China’s largest export market in 1997, much of China’s exports sent to Hong Kong are never intended for consumption,
but instead for processing and re-export to other markets (Feenstra and Hanson, 2004). Furthermore, while Japan is
China’s third largest export market and a potential additional country to investigate, Japan has rarely used antidumping
historically.
10Since China was not a WTO member during the sample period under investigation, even the mere attempt to
track other (non-U.S., non-EU) countries’ imposition of new import restrictions against China at the product level is
extremely diﬃcult, given that such policies were neither restricted by the WTO nor were countries required to report
to the WTO the trade policies imposed against China.
11An antidumping measure would be less discriminatory than a China safeguard if there were multiple exporters
targeted in a multi-country investigation of the same product. Hansen and Prusa (1996) argue that this is likely to
occur in the U.S. due to the incentive created by U.S. law for petitioning industries to seek to cumulate imports in
injury investigations. Furthermore, note that we do not examine the impact of countervailing duties because the U.S.
did not impose any countervailing measures against Chinese products over the 1992-2001 period (Bown, 2005) due to
a 1984 Department of Commerce decision (upheld by the 1986 Georgetown Steel case) not to consider anti-subsidy
investigations of exports from non-market economies like China and the former Soviet Union.
4that the impositions occur in the same (or even adjacent) years.
With respect to our econometric investigation and results, perhaps surprisingly, we ﬁnd no sys-
tematic evidence that U.S. or EU antidumping restrictions deﬂected Chinese exports to secondary
markets over the 1992-2001 period. We examine the potential impact of contemporaneous as well as
lagged eﬀects of such policies, and we employ two distinct econometric approaches. Not only is there
no evidence of trade deﬂection to these markets, there is some weak evidence of a reduction in the
relative growth of Chinese exports of these targeted products to secondary markets. One interpreta-
tion is that this evidence is consistent with a global “chilling eﬀect” of U.S. and EU antidumping on
Chinese exports to alternative markets: i.e., Chinese exporters may be learning that certain products
are in politically sensitive sectors and choosing to slow down their export expansion in these prod-
ucts. The size of the estimated eﬀect is substantial as the conditional mean U.S. antidumping duty
on China of 125% is associated with a 20 percentage point reduction in the relative growth rate of
China’s exports.
Our empirical results indicate no historical evidence of import restrictions deﬂecting Chinese trade
and disrupting established trading patterns. Ironically, it may not be China’s export growth and
ability to deﬂect trade that poses a threat to the world trading system. Rather, a more substantial
threat to the WTO could be the China safeguard policy that has been designed in part to remedy
(the historically non-existent for China) trade deﬂection, but which allows existing WTO members
to easily deviate from the WTO’s core principles of reciprocity and MFN treatment. A substantial
theoretical literature examining the GATT/WTO, closely associated with the work of Bagwell and
Staiger (2002),12 identiﬁes reciprocity and MFN as some of the weakest rules necessary for countries
to rely on to negotiate an eﬃciency-enhancing trade agreement initially and to sustain the agreement
over time in the face of political and economic shocks. From this perspective, our results raise
the question of any political-economic beneﬁt to inclusion of the trade deﬂection provision, when
easy access to the new China safeguard generated by this provision imposes costs via risks to the
sustainability of the WTO.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details our empirical approach and the related
literature. Section 3 describes the data used in the estimation, and section 4 presents our results and
12While much of the initial work in this area is contained in Bagwell and Staiger (2002), other recent papers also
examine the roles of MFN and reciprocity as they relate to issues surrounding the accession of a substantial trading
partner. For example, the principles combine to form a ﬁrst line of defense against ‘bilateral opportunism,’ or the value
of a concession won by one country in an earlier negotiation being eroded due to the outcome of a subsequent set of
negotiations to which it is not party (Bagwell and Staiger, 2005). Furthermore, the principles can also be combined
to facilitate multilaterally eﬃcient outcomes, even when trade policy negotiations occur bilaterally and sequentially
(Bagwell and Staiger, 2004).
5basic robustness checks using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation approach. In section 5 we provide
a last sensitivity analysis using an alternative, instrumental variables estimation approach. Section 6
concludes.
2 Empirical Model and Estimation
2.1 The empirical investigation
Our empirical analysis is motivated by a three country theoretical model in Bown and Crowley (2007)
which develops a number of predictions relating a change in one country’s trade policy to changes
in trade ﬂows among other countries. The most novel predictions are termed “trade deﬂection” and
“trade depression.” When one country (A) imposes a country-speciﬁc tariﬀ on imports from another
country (B), the consequent rise in exports from the second country (B) to the third country (C) is
termed trade deﬂection. Trade depression refers to the reduction in the third country’s (C’s) exports
to the second country (B) when the ﬁrst country (A) imposes a country-speciﬁc tariﬀ on imports
from country B. While it will not be the focus of empirical investigation here, the model also predicts
“trade destruction,” i.e., that country A’s import tariﬀ against country B will result in a fall in A’s
imports from country B. Lastly, the model predicts “trade creation through import source diversion”
or, more succinctly “trade diversion,” i.e., that country A’s imports from country C will rise (Viner,
1950).
In this paper, we estimate an augmented gravity model of China’s (country B’s) product-level
exports to 38 trading partners (countries C) which has been adapted to estimate the eﬀects of U.S.
and EU (countries A) imposition of product-level antidumping duties. For clarity of exposition,
ignoring China’s other trading partners, what eﬀects on trade ﬂows might we expect when the country
imposing the tariﬀ is the U.S. and the foreign countries are Japan (country C) and China (country
B)? First, if the U.S. imposes a country-speciﬁc tariﬀ against China in the form of an antidumping
duty and imposes no tariﬀ against Japan, we might expect deﬂected trade, an increase in Chinese
exports to Japan. Second, if the U.S. imposes a country-speciﬁc tariﬀ against Japan in the form of
an antidumping duty, but not against China, we might expect that Chinese exports to Japan will
fall, i.e., depressed trade. In this case, Japanese exports that are diverted away from the U.S. market
by the tariﬀ and sold domestically within Japan depress Japanese imports from China.
62.2 The empirical model
In light of the WTO rules on the China safeguard, our primary interest is identifying trade deﬂection,
an increase in China’s exports to some country i in response to a trade restriction imposed by another
country such as the U.S. or EU. We begin with a basic gravity speciﬁcation for China’s exports to
country i that incorporates trade policy changes introduced by the U.S. and EU on their own imports
from China. Ultimately we utilize two diﬀerent econometric approaches to estimating trade deﬂection.
Each approach relies on a diﬀerent source of variation in the data to obtain identiﬁcation and, thus,
speaks to the robustness of our results.
To begin, assume that China’s exports to country i of a 6-digit HS product h in year t can be
written as a standard gravity model,




























where xciht denotes exports from China to country i of 6-digit HS product h in year t, aih is country i’s
time-invariant propensity to import good h (e.g., time-invariant trade barriers, transportation costs,
distance, culture, etc.), aht is a time-varying cost or productivity shock to good h, ait represents
country i’s time-varying aggregate variables (e.g., GDP, the exchange rate, aggregate demand for
imports), and act represents China’s time-varying aggregate variables (e.g., GDP, the exchange rate,
aggregate supply of exports). The τ’s in equation (1) are the trade policy changes that might impact
China’s exports to country i. Their ﬁrst subscript indicates the country against which the restrictive
trade policy is imposed, the second subscript indicates the country imposing the trade restriction, the
third subscript denotes the product h, and the fourth subscript denotes the year j. Speciﬁcally, we
include: the U.S. import tariﬀ on good h exported from China (τUS
c,ushj), the EU import tariﬀ on good
h exported from China (τEU
c,euhj), the U.S. import tariﬀ on good h exported from country i (τUS
i,ushj),
the EU import tariﬀ on good h exported from country i (τEU
i,euhj), and country i’s import tariﬀ on
good h exported from China (τi
c,iht). Finally, it may be the case that the impact of a change in a
tariﬀ on trade ﬂows to secondary markets occurs only after a time delay. Thus we allow for current
trade ﬂows to be aﬀected by both the contemporaneous (j = t) imposition of a new trade restriction,
as well as trade policy changes of up to two lags (j = t − 1,t − 2).
In equation (1), the coeﬃcients β1j (β2j) and β3j (β4j) for j = t−2,t−1,t identify trade deﬂection
and trade depression associated with U.S. (EU) antidumping duties, respectively. If the imposition
7of a U.S. (EU) antidumping duty against China is associated with an increase in China’s exports to a
secondary market, we expect that β1j (β2j) will be greater than zero. Furthermore, estimates of β3j
(β4j) that are less than zero indicate trade depression; i.e., the imposition of a U.S. (EU) antidumping
duty against country i is associated with a decrease in China’s exports to that secondary market.
The greatest econometric concerns in estimating trade deﬂection and trade depression in equa-
tion (1) are the potential endogeneity of the tariﬀs and the relationship between a change in a tariﬀ
and any underlying cost or productivity shock aﬀecting a particular 6-digit HS good. With regard to
the tariﬀs, it seems reasonable to assume that the U.S. and EU antidumping duties are set indepen-
dently vis-` a-vis China’s exports to some third country i. Moreover, the correlation between U.S. and
EU trade policy changes against China in our sample is a very low 0.0006 suggesting that the U.S.
and EU only rarely, if ever, respond to a common cost or technology shock in China. Despite this
evidence against the concern that trade policy is responding to a common Chinese technology shock
at the 6-digit HS level, we still want to carefully control for product-level shocks so that our estimates
of the coeﬃcients β1j through β4j can be interpreted as treatment eﬀects of the policy change.
2.3 Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model to estimate trade deﬂection
Our ﬁrst approach identiﬁes trade deﬂection by utilizing variation within a 6-digit HS product across
two exporting countries. First, rewrite an analog to equation (1) in which the exporter, China, is
replaced with a subscript d to denote a diﬀerent exporting country with exporting characteristics
(described below) similar to China. Then we take the time diﬀerence of (1) for China as well as
the time diﬀerence of the analog equation for exporter d, and we diﬀerence those two equations.
Under the assumption that importing country i’s trade policy is constant over the time period under
consideration,13 we then have:













d,euhj) + (∆ciht − ∆diht).
(2)
The variable ∆xciht (∆xdiht) denotes the growth of Chinese (country d) exports of h to country i
at time t where ∆xciht ≡
xciht−xciht−1
(xciht+xciht−1)/2 in our basic speciﬁcations. This average measure of the
growth rate of exports, used by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), allows us to include observations of
13Alternatively, if we assume that country i trade policy varies over time, but is MFN, or nondiscriminatory, we
arrive at the same speciﬁcation.
8zero trade in our estimation sample. Speciﬁcally, this measure caps the growth rate of trade between
t−1 and t at +200% when there is entry into a market and -200% when there is exit from a market.
Including observations of China’s entry (and exit) into speciﬁc markets is important in our empirical
work because we wish to understand if China, as a developing country, is also able to deﬂect its
exports to new markets when it faces trade restrictions that may be shutting it out of the U.S. or EU
markets. Nevertheless, so as to check the robustnsess of our results, we also include speciﬁcations that
use conventional log growth rate measures ∆xciht ≡ lnxciht − lnxciht−1, omitting all observations on
entry and exit by construction. Next, we use year dummies to control for aggregate shocks in China
and country d, (∆act and ∆adt). The variable ∆τUS
c,usht (∆τEU
c,euht) designates the magnitude of the
contemporaneous change in the U.S. (EU) tariﬀ rate against imports from China. Similarly, the
variable ∆τUS
d,usht (∆τEU
d,euht) designates the magnitude of the contemporaneous change in the U.S.
(EU) tariﬀ rate against imports from country d.
When implementing the model on a sample of data, we choose India as ‘country d’ for a number of
reasons. As we detail below, India has considerable similarities with China when it comes to export
structure (both by commodity and by destination market), export growth during this time period,
and it is also an important target of both U.S. and EU use of antidumping.
The coeﬃcients β1j and β2j for j = t−2,t−1,t identify trade deﬂection associated with U.S. and
EU antidumping duties. If the imposition of a U.S. antidumping duty against China is associated
with an increase in China’s exports relative to India’s (country d’s) exports, we expect that β1j will
be greater than zero. Similarly, if an increase in the U.S. antidumping duty against India induces
Indian trade deﬂection, we expect India’s exports to market i to rise relative to China’s exports to
i, yielding a positive coeﬃcient on β1j. The same reasoning implies that trade deﬂection associated
with an EU antidumping measure will yield an estimate of β2j that is positive.
Note, however, that one implication of this particular diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach is that we
cannot identify β3j and β4j - i.e., trade depression - from equation (2). We therefore introduce a
framework for estimating trade depression separately in the next section.
Finally, while equation (2) forms our baseline speciﬁcation, as a robustness check we also estimate
a variant of the model to examine the possibility of “aggregate deﬂection” by China and India (country
d) to all markets other than the U.S. and EU. Speciﬁcally, in this particular sensitivity analysis we
sum Chinese exports to China’s top 41 trading partners less the U.S., EU and India (country d)
for each product in year t (xrow
cht ). Similarly, in accordance with our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence strategy,
we sum India’s (country d’s) exports to those same (China’s top 41) trading partners less the U.S.,
and the EU for each product h in each year t (xrow
dht ). We then estimate an aggregated analog to
equation (2) given by
9(∆xrow
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We also expect that aggregate trade deﬂection associated with U.S. and EU duties will be associated
with positive coeﬃcient estimates of β1j and β2j.
2.4 Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model of trade depression
We use a similar diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach to estimate trade depression. To ﬁx ideas once
again, we are interested in the question of whether China’s exports to a secondary country market
fall if that country’s own exports of a 6-digit HS product are subject to a U.S. or EU antidumping
trade restriction. In order to obtain identiﬁcation in this case, we utilize variation in China’s exports
to two diﬀerent countries that faced U.S. and EU antidumping restrictions between 1992-2001.
Taking the time diﬀerence of (1) for two separate export markets, we write the diﬀerence between
China’s export growth to countries i and k as:













k,euhj) + (∆c,iht − ∆ckht),
(3)
where variables are deﬁned as in (2), and we use year dummies to control for aggregate variation in
countries i and k. The coeﬃcients β3j and β4j for j = t−2,t−1,t identify potential trade depression
associated with U.S. and EU trade policies. Trade depression, a decline in China’s exports to countries
i or k in the face of an antidumping measure, would imply estimates of β3j and β4j that are less than
zero.
Note, ﬁnally, that there are two subtle diﬀerences between equations (3) and (2). First, with
respect to Chinese exports to two diﬀerent countries, even a China-speciﬁc 6-digit HS productivity
shock falls out of the expression, so the restrictiveness of the assumption about time-varying produc-
tivity is less stringent in equation (2). Second, equation (3) implicitly assumes that tariﬀ policies
by countries i and k are constant over the time period under consideration. In order to estimate
equation (3), we choose countries that infrequently changed their own tariﬀs over the sample period.
For reasons we detail below, we estimate equation (3) on relative Chinese export growth to Japan (i)
and Korea (k).
103 Variable Construction and Data
In this section we discuss the construction of variables used in the estimation. Tables 5 and 6 present
summary statistics for the primary data used in the estimation.
3.1 Trade variables
The dependent variables in the estimation of equations (2), (20), and (3) are constructed from the
annual volume of China’s exports to 38 of its top markets for roughly 4700 6-digit Harmonized System
(HS) products for the years 1992 to 2001 (table 1). The data derives from the World Integrated Trade
System (WITS) COMTRADE data base. The dependent variable of equation (2) also requires data
on Indian (country d) exports of the same 4700 products to 38 of China’s top markets. In our
robustness checks, we also use data on the value of Chinese and Indian exports to these markets. Our
ﬁnal estimation sample includes observations on the dependent variable from 1993 to 2001.
First consider the dependent variable in the estimation of equation (2), the diﬀerence between
the annual growth of China’s exports to 38 diﬀerent countries i of commodity h and India’s exports
of the same commodities to the same countries. In choosing India as ‘country d’ in equation (2) we
were guided by a desire to match as closely as possible China’s mix of export markets, its mix of
exported goods, its relatively high aggregate growth rate of exports, and the relatively high number
of antidumping measures imposed by the U.S. and EU between 1992-2001. Table 1 presents the
shares of exports by country for China and India in 1997, the midpoint of our sample. First, the
U.S. and EU are important destination markets for both countries and represent a combined 31.0%
(46.1%) of China’s (India’s) total exports. They share a number of other important export markets
including Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Russia, Australia, Canada and Malaysia. The
biggest diﬀerence is that Hong Kong is China’s top export market with a 24.0% export share while
Hong Kong receives only 5.6% of India’s exports. One likely explanation for this disparity is Hong
Kong’s role in entrepˆ ot trade for exports originating in China (Feenstra and Hanson, 2004).14 Finally,
export shares are similar in other years, but they do reﬂect some changes in the structure of trade
over time.
Table 7 presents the shares of China’s and India’s exports by broadly deﬁned goods categories
for 1997. In terms of the mix of exported goods, the top category for both countries is textiles and
apparel, which account for 14.1% (17.5%) of China’s (India’s) exports. Metals including steel, are
14In the formal estimation, we have run speciﬁcations of the model that drop Hong Kong as an export market, and
we have also examined whether Hong Kong’s re-exports of Chinese goods might account for trade deﬂection. None of
our results were aﬀected by these considerations, though the estimates are available from the authors upon request.
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terms of growth rates, average annual real growth of exports between 1993 and 2001 was 15.8% for
China and 11.0% for India. In our product-level data set, which excludes exports by each country to
the U.S., EU and China or India, average annual growth of the volume of exports (across all markets)
was 16.2% for China and 11.9% for India. Given the similarities of trade structure by destination
markets and by products, the similar high rates of trade growth, and the similar frequencies of AD
investigations that we discuss in the next section, India is the best country to use as a control for
China in such a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence framework.
On the other hand, when we estimate equation (3), we deﬁne the dependent variable as the
diﬀerence between Chinese export growth of product h in year t to Japan and Korea. We choose
Japan and Korea as the export destinations i and k for the following reasons: (1) Japan and Korea
are at similar stages of development with similar industrial structures, (2) the two countries have
similar aggregate rates of import growth from China, and (3) both countries frequently face U.S. and
EU antidumping measures during this time period with some overlap of products that China exports,
making them potentially good targets for identifying trade depression.
While Japan and Korea were not required by WTO rules to report changes in trade policy, in-
cluding antidumping, against China during the 1992-2001 period and, thus, any reporting may be
incomplete, some information is available. Japan reported one antidumping case against China (initi-
ated in 1991) and Korea reported eight investigations between 1992 and 2001. While the information
reported may be incomplete, it is supportive of our assumption that Japan and Korea’s trade policies
against China did not involve high frequency tariﬀ changes during this period.
3.2 U.S. and EU antidumping policy variables
The main explanatory variables of interest are the changes to U.S. and EU import policy facing a
commodity h exported from China or from another country. Our estimates use the level of duties
imposed by the U.S. and by the EU. For EU cases that result in price undertakings, we use reported
dumping margins to proxy for the magnitude of the policy change.15
The information on U.S. and EU measures imposed at the product level derives from a newly
compiled data source (Bown, 2005).16 For the case of the U.S. (EU) antidumping, the information
in the dataset has been collected from original source government publications such as the Federal
Register (Oﬃcial Journal of the European Communities), where we are able to track the dates of
15In unreported results, we have also separated antidumping cases that end in duties versus those that end in price
undertakings, and this does not aﬀect our results.
16See the publicly available ‘Global Antidumping Database,’ at http://www.brandeis.edu/ ˜ cbown/global ad/ .
12investigations, measures imposed, countries aﬀected, and 6-digit HS products that were targeted.
Our estimation examines the export growth path for products targeted by an antidumping measure
for multiple years around the policy’s actual imposition. For both U.S. and EU antidumping measures
examined in the estimation, we identify the focal year t as the initiation year of the antidumping
investigation, as opposed to the year the ﬁnal measure was actually imposed, though frequently they
will be the same. One motivation for this choice is that there has been evidence in prior research that
even antidumping investigations that do not end in imposed measures can have a destructive eﬀect
on imports, due to the uncertainty as to the ﬁnal disposition of the case (Staiger and Wolak, 1994).
Nevertheless, we expect that this decision could lead us to estimate a diﬀerential impact of Chinese
export growth with respect to the timing of U.S. versus EU measures, and in some speciﬁcations we
therefore allow for the lagged imposition of policies (t − 1,t − 2) to aﬀect contemporaneous export
growth.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Diﬀerence-in diﬀerence-estimates of trade deﬂection
Do U.S. and EU antidumping duties deﬂect Chinese and Indian exports to secondary (non-U.S.,
non-EU) markets? Our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence deﬂection estimates, presented in table 8, indicate no
robust evidence of statistically signiﬁcant deﬂection. In fact, rather than an increase in exports to
third markets, U.S. antidumping duties may be associated with a “chilling” eﬀect on Chinese exports
to such alternative markets. With respect to EU trade policy, the only economically and statistically
signiﬁcant ﬁnding is a chilling eﬀect associated with EU duties on steel products.
Our baseline speciﬁcation (1) examines the response of the diﬀerence between China’s and India’s
yearly growth of the volume of trade to the contemporaneous initiation of an AD investigation that
resulted in duties imposed by the U.S. and EU against China and/or India, respectively. At this short
time horizon, the diﬀerence between the within-year policy changes against China and India has no
eﬀect on the diﬀerence in the growth of the volume of exports to alternative markets. Given that it
could take over a year for a U.S. or EU antidumping investigation to result in the imposition of a
deﬁnitive import restriction, the ﬁnding of no contemporaneous response in not entirely surprising.
Our second speciﬁcation (2) utilizes the same dependent variable, but includes lags of the diﬀerence
in the change in the U.S. and EU duties, respectively. We include lags in case the full impact of a
new antidumping restriction is not felt until the full administrative process (or perhaps even longer)
is completed. Furthermore, the timing of the eﬀect of U.S. versus EU policies could vary because of
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earlier on in the investigation, etc. In this speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd that at one lag, an increase in the U.S.
duty against China (or India) is associated with a reduction in the growth rate of Chinese (or Indian)
exports to third countries relative to the growth rate of Indian (or Chinese) exports. We interpret this
as evidence of a potential chilling eﬀect of the U.S. policy on Chinese exports to alternative markets.
In terms of the magnitude of the estimates reported in speciﬁcation (2), a 1% increase in the duty
against China is associated with the diﬀerence in the mean export growth rates between China and
India narrowing by 0.302 percentage points. In our sample, mean growth for Chinese exports over this
period was 16.2% while mean growth for Indian exports was 11.9%. Thus, raising the duty against
China by 1% is associated with a decline in the diﬀerential of the average growth rate of exports
between the two countries from roughly 4.3% (=16.2% - 11.9%) to 4.0%. If the U.S. were to apply
the conditional mean duty against China in the sample (125%), this would imply a 20 percentage
point reduction in Chinese export growth relative to Indian export growth of the same product.
Proceding across speciﬁcations, in column (3) we redeﬁne the dependent variable to be the diﬀer-
ence in the growth rates of the value of exports and ﬁnd that our estimates are robust. A 1% increase
in a U.S. AD duty against one country leads that country’s export growth to be 0.3 percentage points
lower in the year after initiation of the AD investigation that resulted in a duty. In column (4), we
replace the Davis and Haltiwanger deﬁnition for the growth rate of exports (used in construction of
the dependent variable) with the standard log growth rate measure. This measure, by construction,
omits all observations in which China or India enters or exits a particular country’s import market
in a given year. We ﬁnd that the estimate of chilling associated with a U.S. AD duty at a lag of one
year is again robust, suggesting our results are not sensitive to allowing for entry and exit.
Turning to column (5) of table 8, we redeﬁne our dependent variable to be the diﬀerence in the
growth rate of China’s and India’s aggregate exports (to 38 markets) for each particular product,
and we estimate equation (20). Speciﬁcally, we aggregate the total value of exports of each 6-digit
HS product (less exports to the U.S., EU and India or China) in each year for China and India and
then calculate the Davis and Haltiwanger growth rate for each product aggregated across destination
markets in each year. Relative to our other speciﬁcations in which each observation of product-level
export growth to each market i carries equal weight, the aggregated growth speciﬁcation is less likely
to be inﬂuenced by outlier observations of very high or low growth coming from modest changes in
trade volumes when the level of trade is low. Notably, the mean (and standard deviation) of growth
aggregated across products for China and India are 9.3% (0.76) and 11.2% (1.15) respectively, which
are considerably lower than the mean (and standard deviation) of export growth for China and India
of 17.9% (1.27) and 11.9% (1.54), respectively, from our estimation sample for speciﬁcation (3). In
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the U.S. AD duty against China or India is associated with a growth rate for the targeted country
that is 0.41 percentage points lower than the non-targeted country in the year following initiation of
an investigation that resulted in a duty.
Column (6) presents our ﬁnal speciﬁcation which is the eﬀect of U.S. and EU antidumping duties
on a subsample of steel products (HS chapters 72 and 73). Because the steel industry is an active user
of antidumping trade restrictions, we might be concerned that the estimated eﬀects are driven entirely
by steel products. Nevertheless, our restricted steel sample indicates no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
of U.S. antidumping duties, but there is evidence of a chilling eﬀect associated with EU antidumping
measures in the year after the AD investigation is initiated. For this subsample of products, the
magnitude of the chilling eﬀect of an EU antidumping duty is slightly larger - a 1 percent increase in
the duty against one country is associated with the growth rate for the targeted country being 0.93
percentage points lower than that of the non-targeted country.
Thus, while there is no evidence of trade deﬂection, there is some evidence that U.S. and EU
antidumping measures are associated with these targeted Chinese and Indian products slowing down
their export growth to secondary markets. One explanation for the “chilling eﬀect” result could be
that it is self-imposed - i.e., that Chinese or Indian exporters recognize through the U.S. and EU
policy that these products are in politically sensitive product categories. Therefore, in the hope
that they might avoid such import restrictions in secondary markets as well, the exporters take it
upon themselves to curtail their export growth. Nevertheless, this is only one interpretation, as we
cannot rule out the possibility that this chilling eﬀect is the result of the secondary market imposing
its own import restrictions. We would only be able to address this distinction by having access to
data that would fully control for any product-level changes in trade policy on Chinese imports into
these other (i.e., non-U.S., non-EU) markets, a diﬃcult endeavor given the lack of data reporting
requirements vis-` a-vis China during the pre-WTO accession period of the sample, as we described in
the introduction. We do note, however, that alternative markets such as Japan and South Korea that
did report use of antidumping to the WTO during this time period targeted China with AD actions
in products that were diﬀerent from those targeted by the U.S. and EU.
4.2 Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates of trade depression
While there is evidence of a “chilling” eﬀect of U.S. and EU antidumping policies on Chinese exports
to third markets, is there evidence that when the U.S. and EU impose such policies on third countries
that there is also a trade depressing eﬀect on Chinese exports? Table 9 presents our results on trade
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U.S. and EU antidumping. We ﬁnd strong evidence that the imposition of U.S. antidumping duties
against Japan and Korea is associated with a large, economically and statistically signiﬁcant decline
in Chinese exports to Japan and Korea.
Beginning with column (7), our baseline speciﬁcation uses the diﬀerence in the growth of the
volume of Chinese exports to Japan and Korea as the dependent variable. We ﬁnd that a 1% increase
in the U.S. AD duty against Japan or Korea is associated with the growth of Chinese exports to the
targeted country being roughly 1.5 percentage points lower than growth to the non-targeted country.
In contrast we ﬁnd no evidence of depression associated with EU AD duties. This economically large
depression eﬀect of U.S. antidumping is robust across speciﬁcations using the diﬀerent dependent
variable. Column (8) presents a similar result when we add lags of the change in the duty. Column
(9) reports a somewhat larger eﬀect when we redeﬁne the dependent variable to be the diﬀerence
in the value of export growth. In column (10) we use a log growth measure in order to eliminate
observations on entry and exit. The contemporaneous eﬀect of the depression result still exists, though
it is moderated by relative export growth two years later. Lastly, column (11) restricts our sample
steel products and ﬁnds that the magnitude of the coeﬃcient is roughly equal to the coeﬃcient in
the sample of all products, suggesting that the eﬀect in steel products is similar to that in non-steel
products.
We estimate, but do not report, some additional speciﬁcations to help us understand and interpret
the magnitude of our depression result. First, we observe that entry and, especially, exit by Chinese
exporters from speciﬁc markets do not drive our results. To check our results from the log growth
measure speciﬁcation (10), we re-estimate speciﬁcation (9) but drop all observations of Chinese export
growth to Japan or Korea that have a value of +/- 2 (indicating entry and exit). For this speciﬁcation,
our estimate of the eﬀect of the diﬀerence in a change in the U.S. duty on product h in year t increases
slightly in absolute value relative to speciﬁcation (9) to -2.02 (standard error=.818) from -1.98.
Second, we observe that depression is primarily driven by U.S. AD activity against Japan. A few
statistics bring this into view. In our sample of 29474 observations, we have only 16 antidumping
duties imposed by the U.S. against Korea, but 42 imposed against Japan.17 Moreover, when we
look at the mean growth rates of Chinese exports to Korea and Japan conditional upon a U.S.
antidumping duty, we ﬁnd that Chinese exports to Korea are higher while Chinese exports to Japan
are substantially lower.
17To clarify, although the U.S. imposed antidumping measures on roughly 95 (120) diﬀerent 6-digit HS export
products from Korea (Japan) during this time period, Korea (Japan) only imported 16 (42) of these same products
from China.
16Third, we have performed a number of industry-speciﬁc regressions which indicate that depression
is driven by a variety of products for which Japan faced antidumping duties over a number of years.
Fourth, because two products, ferro-silicon/silico-manganese (HS=720230) and temporary lighters
(HS=961310) were subject to antidumping investigations in diﬀerent years by Japan, Korea, the U.S.
and EU, we re-estimated all of our depression speciﬁcations in the absence of observations on these
products. Our estimates were identical to those reported in table 4 to one decimal place.18
Lastly, to better understand the magnitude of our depression coeﬃcient, we calculate the mean
change in the level of the value of Chinese exports to Japan, conditional on a U.S. AD duty being
imposed. We ﬁnd that Chinese exports to Japan fall by about U.S.$1 million when the U.S. imposes
an AD duty on its imports from Japan. In our dataset, aggregate Chinese exports to Japan rise from
roughly U.S.$15 billion in 1993 to U.S.$44 billion in 2001. Thus, our estimate of depression, while
large and economically signiﬁcant in the markets for some products, is small relative to the total
value of Japanese imports from China.
5 Robustness: IV estimates of trade deﬂection and trade de-
pression
5.1 Panel data regression model
Given that our estimates of equations (2) and (3) could be sensitive to the choice of countries d (India),
i (Japan), and k (Korea), we present a ﬁnal check on the robustness of our results by examining an
alternative model that relies more on cross-sectional variation across 6-digit products and countries to
obtain identiﬁcation. This has some similarities to the approach taken in Bown and Crowley (2007).19
In this alternative approach, we start with the time diﬀerence of (1):
18Japan reported initiating an AD investigation on imports of ferro-silicon (HS=720230) from China in 1991. The
U.S. imposed an antidumping restriction on the same 6-digit product in 1993, the EU in 1996 and Korea in 1997. The
EU restricted imports of temporary lighters (HS=961310) from China in 1990 and Korea restricted imports of the same
product in 1997.
19Bown and Crowley (2007) estimate trade deﬂection and trade depression associated with U.S. antidumping against
Japanese exports in a panel data model in which Japanese industry-level covariates proxy for technology and cost
shocks. The analysis above, in contrast, uses the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence equation (2) that does not require product-
level controls to estimate trade deﬂection. This is useful because comparably disaggregated data to proxy for technology
and costs shocks is not available for China during the sample. Nevertheless, as a robustness check to the panel data
model in Bown and Crowley (2007), they also estimated the Japanese sample on a similar model with product-level
ﬁxed eﬀects and obtained consistent results, thus motivating our robustness check here.























where we assume that country i’s trade policy toward China is constant over the time period under
investigation. Then, we use 6-digit product ﬁxed eﬀects and lagged export growth to proxy for
time-varying cost or productivity shocks at the product level. Our estimating equation is then:
























where in estimating we apply the instumental variables techniques of Anderson and Hsiao (1981,
1982) because the autocorrelation of the dependent variable implies that least squares estimation
yields biased estimates.20 In the estimation, we instrument for the lagged growth rate, ∆xciht−1,
with the second lag of the log level of exports, ln(xciht−2) if xciht−2 > 1 and a value of zero if the
second lag of the level of exports is less than 1.21
By utilizing 6-digit HS product ﬁxed eﬀects in (5) we control for changes in production costs or
technology that imply that a particular good h will have a growth rate for exports that is higher
or lower than average. Note that commodities with very high average growth rates also tend to be
those most likely to be targeted for antidumping measures. As in equations (2) and (3) we use year
dummies to control for all aggregate variation in China and country i over time.
For estimating equation (5), we calculate annual export growth of China’s exports to 38 diﬀerent
countries i listed in table 1, excluding the U.S., EU and India.
20An alternative approach such as the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator which utilizes multiple lags of
the level of the dependent variable as an instrument for the lagged growth rate is not computationally feasible in our
estimation because of the large number of parameters in (5).
21Because the bias associated with using a weak instrument may be large, we test the quality of our instrument.
First-stage restricted and unrestricted regressions are reported in table A-1 for our baseline speciﬁcation. For all
speciﬁcations, the F-statistics of roughly 312,000 are far larger than the 99% critical χ2(1) of 6.63. We conclude that
the second lag of the log level of exports is a strong instrument for the lagged growth rate.
185.2 Instrumental variables estimates of trade deﬂection and trade depres-
sion
Table 10 presents our estimates of trade deﬂection and trade depression from a panel of Chinese
exports to 38 countries. Our ﬁnding of a chilling eﬀect of U.S. AD duties from the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence equation (2) discussed in section 4.1 appears to be robust across models. Although we
ﬁnd no evidence of chilling in speciﬁcation (12) which regresses the growth of the volume of Chinese
trade on only the contemporaneous initiation of AD cases that resulted in changes in U.S. and EU
AD duties, when we include two lags of each change in a duty in speciﬁcation (13), we ﬁnd that a 1%
increase in the U.S. AD duty against Chinese exports is associated with a 0.127% reduction in the
growth of exports in the following year. For the conditional mean U.S. antidumping duty on China’s
exports in the sample of 125%, this implies a 15.9 percentage point fall in the growth of Chinese
exports to an alternative market. When we redeﬁne the dependent variable to be the value of exports
(14), we estimate a chilling eﬀect that is similar in magnitude but which is not statistically signiﬁcant
at standard conﬁdence levels. Part of the explanation for this result is the additional observations
added to the sample when we switch to values from volumes, as the COMTRADE data reports many
observations for Chinese export values that do not include a volume counterpart.
In speciﬁcation (15), we redeﬁne the dependent variable to be the log growth of the value of exports,
and in (16) we redeﬁne it to be the Davis-Haltiwanger growth of the value of exports aggregated across
the 38 markets in our sample. Both speciﬁcations also yield chilling estimates at one lag, a 1% duty
implies roughly a 0.10 and 0.15% reduction in export growth, respectively. The last speciﬁcation,
(17), restricts the sample to steel exports and ﬁnds evidence consistent with our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
estimates of table 8, i.e., there is no statistically signiﬁcant evidence of deﬂection or chilling associated
with U.S. imposition of antidumping on Chinese steel.
The next set of estimates in table 10 suggest evidence of a contemporaneous chilling eﬀect of an
EU antidumping duty against imports from China on Chinese exports to third countries. This diﬀers
slightly from our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates presented in table 8 which found no statistically
signiﬁcant relationship between EU antidumping and Chinese exports to third countries. Across the
6 speciﬁcations in table 10, estimates of the magnitude of the eﬀect range from a low of a 0.17% fall
in the growth of the value of Chinese exports to a high of a 0.52% fall in the value of Chinese exports
of steel products when the EU increases its duty by 1%. For the regression on steel products (column
17), although the timing is slightly diﬀerent, the relative size of the result vis-` a-vis the estimate on
the full sample of products is in line with the estimates from our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model.
In order to understand the diﬀerences between the results of our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model
19and our IV panel model, we can also examine the sources of variation in the data that identify the
deﬂection/chilling eﬀect for EU AD duties. In the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model of trade deﬂection,
identiﬁcation comes from variation between Chinese and Indian growth rates within a product. How-
ever, EU antidumping measures are highly correlated across China and India, especially for steel. The
correlation between EU antidumping measures for China and India is 0.31 in our sample compared
to only 0.26 for the U.S. Moreover, the correlation for EU measures is higher (0.66) when we limit
our sample to steel products compared to a correlation of 0.47 for the U.S. Thus, identiﬁcation of
the eﬀect of EU AD duties is relatively weak in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model. However, there is
some evidence of chilling in the IV panel estimates because identiﬁcation in that model comes from
(a) time variation in the growth rate within a product exported by China and (b) cross sectional
variation across products exported by China.
Next consider the third panel of table 10 which presents our estimates of trade depression associ-
ated with U.S. AD duties against China. In contrast to our results from the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
model, there is no robust evidence of trade depression associated with U.S. AD duties from our
IV estimates on a panel of 38 of China’s trading partners. While the estimated coeﬃcient on the
contemporaneous eﬀect is frequently negative, it is not statistically signiﬁcant.
The lowest panel of estimates in table 10 presents coeﬃcient estimates of potential trade depres-
sion arising from EU AD duties. As with the U.S. estimates, there is no robust evidence of trade
depression associated with EU antidumping duties. For two speciﬁcations, the logged growth measure
(column 15) and steel products (column 17), there is one statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimate
that indicates trade depression. However, as these results are not robust to slight changes in the
speciﬁcation.
A simple explanation for the lack of trade depression in the IV panel model can be found by
re-estimating the speciﬁcation in column (13) on a restricted sample of Chinese exports to Japan
and Korea only. In this smaller sample we do observe contemporaneous trade depression, consistent
with our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates reported in table 9. This suggests that Japan and Korea
are unusual among China’s export partners and that the phenonomenon of trade depression is likely
limited to the few countries that face very high antidumping duties emanating from the U.S. and EU.
5.3 Puzzles and Potential Explanations
A number of potentially complementary explanations are consistent with our results that Chinese
exporters did not deﬂect trade during the 1992-2001 period. First, it could be that the Chinese
products hit with U.S. and EU antidumping measures are primarily the function of export platform
20activity that can easily be disassembled and relocated to another country. It could also be that some
of the products are highly diﬀerentiated with speciﬁcations designed (by U.S. or EU retailers) for
one particular export market. Or it could be that these other WTO members were applying higher
(non-MFN) tariﬀs against China during its pre-accession period that China was not able to penetrate.
Finally, it could relate to the fact that as a “new” entrant into the global economy, Chinese ﬁrms did
not yet have the networks over the 1992-2001 period to deﬂect trade to alternate markets, perhaps
not yet having paid the market-speciﬁc ﬁxed cost of entry.
Regardless of the explanation, our result of “missing” trade deﬂection is puzzling given that
there was such concern about the phenomenon among the WTO membership that China’s terms of
accession include a safeguard to pre-emptively control it.
6 Conclusion
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) introduced a new China safeguard that
allowed existing members to substantially deviate from the WTO’s core principles of reciprocity and
most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment based on the threat of trade deﬂection. This paper uses a
new data set to construct measures of product-level, discriminatory trade policy actions that two of
China’s most important trading partners imposed on its exports during the 1992-2001 period. We
ﬁnd no systematic evidence that either U.S. or EU imposition of discriminatory import restrictions
during this period deﬂected Chinese exports to alternative destinations. To the contrary, we provide
some evidence that EU and U.S. trade restrictions may have a chilling eﬀect on China’s exports to
secondary markets - i.e., the application of the mean U.S. duty is associated with a 20 percentage
point reduction in the relative growth of targeted Chinese (vis-` a-vis untargeted Indian) exports of
the same product.
Our results do raise a number of policy concerns. One derives from a comparison of the results
in this paper and the empirical evidence of trade deﬂection from studies of developed countries (e.g.,
Bown and Crowley, 2007). Developing country exporters may face an additional cost to antidumping
if they are unable to deﬂect trade and recoup some of their losses.22 This could suggest that the
failure to reform antidumping in the Doha Round is even more detrimental to developing countries
than had previously been considered.
The lack of historical evidence of Chinese trade deﬂection presents a potential additional con-
22For example, we found China did not deﬂect steel exports whereas Japan did deﬂect steel exports in the face of
U.S. antidumping measures. Thus, the lack of trade deﬂection by developing countries is not simply a product-level
phenomenon determined solely by the diﬀerences in the countries’ export baskets.
21cern raised by the terms of China’s WTO accession. Given the theoretical insights of Bagwell and
Staiger (2002) regarding the importance of the reciprocity and MFN rules to the sustainability of the
eﬃciency-enhancing features of the WTO, the easy-to-access, new China safeguard remains a threat
to the WTO. The China safeguard policy itself may pose a bigger threat to the world trading system
than the trade deﬂection it was partially designed to control.
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25Table 1: China’s and India’s Major Export Markets, 1997
Rank 
 
Export Market  
 
 
Share of China’s 
Total Exports, 1997 
 
 
Share of India’s 
Total Exports, 1997 
 
      
1 Hong  Kong    0.240  0.056 
2  United States   0.179  0.196 
3 Japan    0.174  0.055 
4 European  Union  0.131  0.265 
5 South  Korea  0.050  0.014 
6 Singapore  0.024  0.022 
7 Taiwan    0.019  0.011 
8 Russia  0.011  0.028 
9 Malaysia  0.011  0.014 
10 Australia  0.011  0.013 
11 Canada  0.010  0.012 
12 Indonesia  0.010  0.013 
13 Thailand  0.008  0.001 
14 Philippines  0.007  0.007 
15  United Arab Emirates  0.007  0.047 
16 Vietnam  0.006  0.004 
17 Brazil  0.006  0.004 
18 Panama  0.006  0.001 
19 India  0.005  - 
20 Saudi  Arabia  0.005  0.020 
21 South  Africa  0.004  0.012 
22 Bangladesh  0.004  0.023 
23 Poland  0.004  0.003 
24 Pakistan  0.004  0.004 
25 Macau  0.004 0.000 
26 Switzerland  0.003  0.010 
27 Myanmar  0.003  0.001 
28 Norway  0.003  0.002 
29 Chile  0.003  0.004 
30 Turkey  0.003  0.007 
31 North  Korea  0.003  0.001 
32 Iran  0.003  0.005 
33 Argentina  0.003  0.003 
34 Egypt  0.003  0.007 
35 Mexico  0.002  0.003 
36 Nigeria  0.002  0.006 
37 Hungary  0.002  0.001 
38 New  Zealand  0.002  0.002 
39 Israel  0.001  0.000 
40 Czech  Republic 0.001  0.001 
41 Kazakhastan  0.001 0.000 
 China  -  0.021 
      
 
Source: compiled by the authors from COMTRADE. 
26Table 2: U.S. and EU Use of Antidumping Measures, 1992-2001
















of target country’s 
investigations) 
Mean margin 
(%),  cond’l 
on measures 
imposed 




            
1 China  55  (0.14) 35 (0.64) 26 (0.47) 137.27 0.08 (5)
2 EU  47  (0.12) 20 (0.43) 10 (0.21) 29.24 0.19 (2)
3 Japan 38  (0.10) 21 (0.55) 11 (0.29) 63.11 0.13 (3)
4 South  Korea 32  (0.08) 15 (0.47) 3 (0.09) 15.36 0.03 (7)
5 Taiwan  23  (0.06) 13 (0.57) 3 (0.13) 19.72 0.03 (6)
6 Mexico  21  (0.05) 7 (0.33) 4 (0.19) 43.60 0.10 (4)
7 Brazil  18  (0.05)  9  (0.50)  1  (0.06)  63.35  0.01  (12) 
8 Canada  18  (0.05)  5  (0.28)  6  (0.33)  22.38  0.19  (1) 
9 India  16  (0.04)  9  (0.56)  2  (0.13)  50.37  0.01  (19) 
10 South  Africa  12  (0.03)  5  (0.42)  1  (0.08)  42.95  0.00  (26) 
                    
 All  other  116  (0.29)  50  (0.43)  12  (0.10)  73.50  0.22   
                    
                    
  Total 396  (1.00)  189  (0.48)  79  (0.20)  66.31  1.00   
                    
 
















of target country’s 
investigations) 
Mean margin 
(%),  cond’l 
on measures 
imposed 




            
1 China  53  (0.15) 23 (0.43) 27 (0.51) 76.93 0.06 (4)
2 India  28  (0.08) 15 (0.54) 6 (0.21) 80.85 0.01 (20)
3 South  Korea 26  (0.07) 13 (0.50) 7 (0.27) 24.58 0.02 (9)
4 Thailand  22  (0.06) 13 (0.59) 1 (0.05) 41.87 0.01 (21)
5 Russia  19  (0.05) 10 (0.53) 3 (0.16) 99.81 0.03 (6)
6 Taiwan  16  (0.04) 8 (0.50) 6 (0.38) 28.11 0.03 (7)
7 Malaysia  15  (0.04)  9  (0.60)  1  (0.07)  34.52  0.02  (18) 
8 Ukraine  14  (0.04)  7  (0.50)  0  (0.00)  132.43  0.00  (50) 
9 Indonesia  13  (0.04)  7  (0.54)  0  (0.00)  60.77  0.01  (23) 
10 Turkey  13  (0.04)  3  (0.23)  3  (0.23)  32.63  0.02  (13) 
                    
 All  other  138  (0.39)  67  (0.49)  20  (0.14)  58.85  0.78   
                    
                    
  Total 357  (1.00)  175  (0.49)  74  (0.21)  60.04  1.00   
                    
 
Note:   Antidumping data compiled by the authors from Bown (2005). Import data from COMTRADE. †EU import data is 
extra-EU imports only. 
27Table 3: U.S. and EU Antidumping Against China’s and India’s Export Products, 1990-2001







   
Exports from China facing U.S. antidumping measures  77 
Exports from China facing EU antidumping measures  60 
   
 Exports  from  China  facing both U.S. and EU antidumping measures  14 
   
Exports from India facing U.S. antidumping measures  36 
Exports from India facing EU antidumping measures  32 
   
 Exports from India facing both U.S. and EU antidumping measures 8 
   
 
Notes: data compiled by the authors based on Bown (2005). 
†  ‘Unique’ relates to the fact that some 6-digit HS 
products may have been investigated or hit with an antidumping measure more than once during the 12 year 
sample. 




† (HS 1992 code) 
 
Year of EU AD 
Measure Against China 
 
Year of U.S. AD 
Measure Against China 
 
    
Foundry Coke (270400)   1999  2000 
Persulfates (283340)   1994  1996 
Sulfanilic Acid (292142)   2001  1991 
Coumarin (293221)   1994  1994 
Ferrosilicon (720221)   1992  1992 
Ferrosilicon (720229)   1992  1992 
Silicomanganese (720230)   1996  1993 
Steel Plate (720842)   1999  1996 
Steel Plate (720843)   1999  1996 
Iron Waterworks Fittings (730719)   1999  1992 
Carbon Steel Pipe Fittings (730793)   1994  1991 
Lug Nuts (731816)   1996  1990 
Pure Magnesium (810411)   1997  2000 
Pure Magnesium (810419)   1997  2000 
    
 




29Table 5: Data Summary Statistics for Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Approach to Trade Deﬂection
 
 
Difference-in-Difference Model of Deflection 
Sample Size  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
 
Dependent Variables  
      
Difference in volume of export growth of product h  227555 0.0431  1.9788 
Yearly growth of the volume of China’s exports of product h  227555 0.1621  1.2355 
Yearly growth of the volume of India's exports of product h   227555  0.1190  1.5700 
Difference in value of export growth of product h 259595  0.0602  1.9812 
Yearly growth of the value of China’s exports of product h 259595  0.1797  1.2690 
Yearly growth of the value of India’s exports of product h 259595  0.1195  1.5471 
Difference in value of export growth of product h to ROW  37378  -0.0192  1.3695 
Yearly growth of the value of China’s exports of product h to ROW  37378 0.0932  0.7600 
Yearly growth of the value of India’s exports of product h to ROW  37378  0.1124  1.1565 
 
Explanatory Variables  
 
    
U.S. AD duty against China less U.S. AD duty against  India  227555 0.0012  0.0361 
U.S. AD duty against China conditional on a duty (%)  429 125.12  80.51 
U.S. AD duty against India conditional on a duty (%)  156 41.44  35.00 
EU AD duty against China less EU AD duty against  India  227555 0.0002  0.0272 
EU AD duty against China conditional on a duty (%)  392 67.06  38.11 
EU AD duty against India conditional on a duty (%)  319 65.64  66.48 
      
U.S. AD duty against China less U.S. AD duty against  India  259595 0.0011  0.0346 
U.S. AD duty against China conditional on a duty (%)  459 123.28  80.22 
U.S. AD duty against India conditional on a duty (%)  156 41.43  34.62 
EU AD duty against China less EU AD duty against  India  259595 0.0002  0.0265 
EU AD duty against China conditional on a duty (%)  411 67.46  38.51 
EU AD duty against India conditional on a duty (%)  319 65.58  67.18 
      
U.S. AD duty against China less U.S. AD duty against  India  37378 0.0010  0.0351 
U.S. AD duty against China conditional on a duty (%)  57 141.44  88.41 
U.S. AD duty against India conditional on a duty (%)  25 44.75  33.49 
EU AD duty against China less EU AD duty against  India  37378 0.0002  0.0178 
EU AD duty against China conditional on a duty (%)  37 57.04  33.05 
EU AD duty against India conditional on a duty (%)  19 63.55  65.25 
      
 
 
30Table 6: Data Summary Statistics for Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Approach to Trade Depression
 
 
Difference-in-Difference Model of Depression 
Sample Size  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
 
Dependent Variables  
      
Difference in volume of export growth of product h  25975 -0.0763  1.4853 
Yearly growth of the volume of China’s exports to Japan 
25975 0.1439  1.0256 
Yearly growth of the volume of China's exports to Korea   25975  0.2202  1.2432 
Difference in value of export growth of product h 29474  -0.0686  1.5173 
Yearly growth of the value of China’s exports to Japan  29474  0.1744  1.0121 
Yearly growth of the value of India’s exports of product h 29474  0.2430  1.2628 
 
Explanatory Variables  
 
    
U.S. AD duty against Japan less U.S. AD duty against Korea  25975 0.0004  0.0121 
U.S. AD duty against Japan conditional on a duty (%)  39 35.82  24.99 
U.S. AD duty against Korea conditional on a duty (%)  15 16.36  14.31 
EU AD duty against Japan less EU AD duty against  Korea  25975 0.0001  0.0124 
EU AD duty against Japan conditional on a duty (%)  9 81.44  29.37 
EU AD duty against Korea conditional on a duty (%)  11 36.09  26.46 
      
U.S. AD duty against Japan less U.S. AD duty against Korea  29474 0.0004  0.0127 
U.S. AD duty against Japan conditional on a duty (%)  42 38.29  26.22 
U.S. AD duty against Korea conditional on a duty (%)  16 16.77  13.92 
EU AD duty against Japan less EU AD duty against  Korea  29474 0.0001  0.0116 
EU AD duty against Japan conditional on a duty (%)  9 81.44  29.37 
EU AD duty against Korea conditional on a duty (%)  12 34.20  26.06 
 
 
31Table 7: China’s and India’s Major Export Products, 1997
Harmonized 
System Chapters  Description  Share of China's 
Total Exports 
Share of India's 
Total Exports 
     
01-05  Animal and Animal Products  0.000  0.000 
06-15 Vegetable  Products  0.000  0.000 
16-24 Foodstuffs  0.137  0.076 
25-27 Mineral  Products  0.027  0.018 
28-38  Chemicals & Allied Industries  0.157  0.157 
39-40  Plastics / Rubber   0.035  0.039 
41-43 Leather    0.013  0.006 
44-49  Wood & Wood Products  0.069  0.042 
50-63 Textiles  &  Apparel  0.141  0.175 
64-67 Footwear  /  Headgear  0.004  0.011 
68-71  Stone / Glass   0.047  0.040 
72-83 Metals  0.101  0.118 
84-85  Machinery / Electrical   0.170  0.202 
86-89 Transportation  0.027  0.022 
90-97 Miscellaneous  0.065  0.089 
     
 
Source: compiled by the authors from COMTRADE. 
32Table 8: Diﬀerence-In-Diﬀerence Approach to Trade Deﬂection: The Impact of U.S. and EU An-
tidumping on China’s Export Growth Relative to India’s Export Growth, 1992-2001
 
Dependent Variable: 
Yearly growth† of China’s exports of product h to country i less  
























U.S. AD duty against China less  
  U.S. AD duty against India 
        
































EU AD duty against China  less  
  EU AD duty against India        
































Other Controls        
 
 Year  dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 227555  227462  259595  110691  37378  12916 
R
2 0.0033 0.0034 0.0021 0.0022 0.0032 0.0033 
 
Notes: † Subscript h is a 6-digit HS product, and t is a year, the growth rate is defined using the Davis and Haltiwanger  (1992) measure 
described in the text and is thus bounded between -2 (exit) and 2 (entry).  In parentheses are standard errors, with  ***, **, and * denote 
variables statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
33Table 9: Diﬀerence-In-Diﬀerence Approach to Trade Depression: The Impact of U.S. and EU An-
tidumping on China’s Export Growth to Japan Relative to Korea, 1992-2001
 
Dependent Variable: 
Yearly growth† of China’s exports of product h to Japan less  


















U.S. AD duty against Japan less  
  U.S. AD duty against Korea 
       


























EU AD duty against Japan less  
  EU AD duty against Korea        


























Other Controls        
 
 Year  dummies 
 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 25975  25966  29474  21123  1483 
R
2  0.0130 0.0131  0.0134 0.0119 0.0499 
 
Notes: † Subscript h is a 6-digit HS product, and t is a year, the growth rate is defined using the Davis and Haltiwanger  (1992) 
measure described in the text and is thus bounded between -2 (exit) and 2 (entry).  In parentheses are standard errors, with  ***, 
**, and * denote variables statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
34Table 10: IV Approach and Panel Estimates: The Impact of U.S. and EU Antidumping Measures on
China’s Exports to Secondary Markets, 1992-2001
 
 
  Dependent Variable: Yearly growth† of China’s exports of 
product h to country i  




























































EU AD duty against China [Trade Deflection]          
































U.S. AD duty against country i [Trade Depression]          
































EU AD duty against country i [Trade Depression]          
































Other Controls          
Instruments for growth of China’s exports of h to 
 country i in t-1  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Product h fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 478931  478851  563430  355555  38282  28762 
R
2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.04  0.12  0.10 
Notes: † Subscript h is a 6-digit HS product, and t is a year, the growth rate is defined using the Davis and Haltiwanger  (1992) measure described in the text 
and is thus bounded between -2 (exit) and 2 (entry).  In parentheses are White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors corrected for clusters defined on 
the variable defined as the 6-digit HS product and year combination.  ***, **, and * denote variables statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 
35Table A-1: Testing Instrument Quality: First Stage Regressions
 
  Dependent Variable: Yearly growth† of China’s exports of 
product h to country i in t-1 
Explanatory Variables  Unrestricted first stage regression  
(13) 
Restricted first stage regression  
(13) 
U.S. AD duty against China 
  












EU AD duty against China     












U.S. AD duty against country i    












EU AD duty against country i    












Other Controls    
Second lag of the log level of China’s exports of h to country i  -0.131*** 
(0.000)  -- 
Product h fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Observations 534768  534768 
R
2 0.39  0.03 
 
Notes: † Subscript h is a 6-digit HS product, and t is a year, the growth rate is defined using the Davis and Haltiwanger  (1992) measure described in the 
text and is thus bounded between -2 (exit) and 2 (entry).  In parentheses are White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors corrected for clusters 
defined on the variable defined as the 6-digit HS product and year combination.  ***, **, and * denote variables statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 
10 percent levels, respectively. 
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